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THE REFUGEE - WAR CLAIMS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
TADEUSZ B. SPITZER*
A STUDY OF THE HISTORY of forced mass population movements sug-
gests that the refugee's individual material rights have been either sub-
jugated to the state, wantonly abused, or completely ignored. It makes
little difference whether these mass movements are prompted by eco-
nomic, religious, political, or social pressures when they are accompanied
by a threat to life; man obeys his primordial instinct to survive and flees,
leaving behind most or all of his material wealth. History repeatedly
records such forced emigrations and the resulting injustices. This, then, is
the question: how may a refugee gain compensation for losses and/or
damages suffered by him personally or to his material property?
Recovery of, or restitution for, a refugee's involuntarily surrendered
property is practically impossible. There is no international private law
to protect his rights. Neither is there an international court to which he
can submit his claims. The problem increases in complexity when one
considers the ramifications extending to political science, international
relations, world economics, international public and private law, and
domestic issues of particular nations.
With the outbreak of war thousands of people fled their homes
without identification. In this way they became stateless, and thus could
not meet the formal requirements for admission into certain countries.
Progress has been partially made concerning the refugee's political rights
in the last fifty years. The Nansen passports following World War I,
were primarily issued for refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution and
other stateless individuals.
*M.B.A., Vienna Academy of Commerce; J.S.D., Ec.D., University of Vienna.
Formerly Professor of World Economic and International Trade, Armstrong Col-
lege, Berkeley, California. Member of the Stanford University Faculty Study of
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THE REFUGEE AND WAR CLAIMS
The Intergovernmental Committee on
Refugees was established by the Conven-
tion of Evians in 1938, originally for politi-
cal and religious refugees from Germany
but then extended to similar refugees from
other Nazi-occupied countries. Sweden
issued its Fremlingpass during World War
II, and the Dutch government in exile
offered still another passport substitute by
issuing a statement that visas were not
required for entrance into Surinam (Cura-
gao). These statements obtained from
Dutch consulates permitted the refugees to
leave Russia, to enter Japan, and from
there, if they obtained visas, to immigrate
to particular countries, otherwise, to go
without visa to Shanghai or Surinam. The
United Nations set up the International
Refugee Organization (IRO) to repatriate
or help refugees resettle in other countries.
IRO was dissolved in 1949; its work was
transferred to the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees in 1951.
These interim actions, important as they
were, settled only theoretically the status
of the refugee from the standpoint of public
international law. The Geneva Convention
was adopted by about twenty nations. The
above short description underscores that
part of public international law is being
taken care of by an international institution
which proceeds on a certain program and
is responsible to the UN.
The purpose of the following article is,
therefore, to consider the aspects of inter-
national private law which is not covered
by any existing agency. Such law should
compensate refugees for material damages
suffered since World.War I and prevent
future repetition of the present situation
by the formulation of certain principles of
international private law.
The Nature and Character of
. Private Claims
According to their causes, losses suffered
by individual refugees may be divided
roughly into two categories:
(1) war damages originated by actions
of military personnel;
(2) postwar damages inflicted by mob
action, such as vandalism or theft, or other
mass or individual criminal activities which
exploit the absence of the owner and the
new government's inability to maintain
public security.
To the same category belong any dolus
and culpa lata of a temporary trustee
established by the occupying power or
by the new government in absentia of the
owner. Here also belong acts of the occu-
pying power or the new government which
are based on nationalization in any form,
expropriation, and outright confiscation,
irrespective of whether they are rooted in
war demands and/or security measures
or in various degrees of ideological differ-
ences between the socio-economic sys-
tems of individual property and public
ownership.
The scope and extent of private claims
of the refugee under international law are
multilateral. Claims are based on various
kinds of damages and losses, some of them
are personal in character, material losses
sensu late, which should be evaluated in
terms of money, and damages and losses
which originally are material claims sensu
stricto.
To the first category belong death o
family members and loss or severe deterio-
ration of health. The list of those in the
second category is much longer: loss of pro-
fessional and social position, loss of in-
come from professional activities, loss of
social security and private insurance bene-
fits and endowments, loss of capital values
such as real estate, servitudes, and fran-
chises on them, loss of income from real
estate caused by damage and destruction
of immobile property, destruction or theft
of mobile property, cost of resettlement
caused by the necessity of leaving the occu-
pied territory in order to save life or free-
dom, and losses derived from devaluations
of monetary systems and inflations of
objects and rights following wars. These
are but a few of the best known examples
of sensu stricto (private material) claims.
Not generally known are cases in which
refugees have suffered some or all of those
damages more than once within a single
generation: during World War I, in Russia
in 1917, in various European countries
following the breakdown of the Austrian,
German, and Ottoman empires in 1918,
in Hitlerized Germany of the 1930's, in
Spain in 1936, and in several countries
during World War II. Since then, displaced
persons have been victims of material
losses in Asia, more recently in Africa.
These happenings qualify the problem as
one which is world-wide. It should be dealt
with under private international material
law and under the principles of justice
which recognizes man's right to be compen-




Recent developments in the fields of
communication, transportation, and tech-
nology also caused the development of
international movements of persons, goods,
and money which' are artificially suppressed.
To deny a refugee the guarantee in the
entire field of private claims which exceed
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the boundaries of a nation or a state would
be in existing conditions a contradictio in
adjectu. Nonetheless, those rights are sus-
pended in the vacuum of unformulated
legislative possibilities and unrespected
obligations, uninterrupted by boundaries
but interrupted by wars.
To say that an individual is not subject
to international law is questionable even
under public international law. It is much
more incorrect under private international
law. Such inference is rooted in the fact
that international law had its beginnings
at a time of absolute sovereignty of the
state. Today, under democratic principles,
the sovereignty belongs to the people, not
to the government. _
In domestic relations the individual has
his independent material rights guaran-
teed by municipal legal systems within a
country. He has no rights guaranteed by
any system of international law, nor does
he have any means of being represented
in case of a dispute between himself and
another state except by his own govern-
ment, which has the duty to protect its
citizens against any abuse of their rights
by citizens and governments of other states.
At the present status of international legis-
lation only governments are subject to
international law.
There does not exist any uniform system
of ground rules which govern the specific
problem of the settlement of claims filed
by private individuals for reimbursement
of damages caused by wars. Private citizens,
in such cases, too often are victims of politi-
cal expediency, which subjugates justice
based on prudence to administrative con-
venience. This appears to be inconsistent
with national and international law whose
purpose is to establish, develop, and justify
the principles of human behavior. The
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actual settlement of individual claims
should be left to the judicial branch of
the government as separate and distinct
cases.
Finding legal remedies for settlement of
material damages suffered by masses of
displaced and dispossessed persons is com-
plicated by the lack of any agency which
would be competent in a jurisdictional
sense in these matters. Those questions
belong to international private law and to
international courts of justice. But there is
no international private law binding gov-
ernments, and there is no international
agency which could decide these questions.
In some instances, governments inter-
vene against nationalization and expropria-
tion. However, in similar actions the same
governments disregard personal losses of
their citizens which occur through acts of
force during and after war, and ignore
individual claims for reimbursement of the
damage suffered. In the cold war of ideo-
logical conflicts the damage to citizens and
their property by criminal actions often is
neglected in favor of political maneuvering.
What is most disturbing about the situa-
tion is that little or nothing has been done
to correct the wrongs. Damages suffered
by private citizens as the result of war
have been extensive since 1939. The prob-
lem is world-wide and properly belongs to
the judicial forum of private international
law, because these are private claims of
individuals of one country against indi-
viduals or governments of another country.
Unfortunately, such a private international
law has never been codified or sanctioned.
The settlement of private citizens' ma-
terial losses and damages should become
a prerequisite for political treaties. How-
ever, it should not be handled by the
administrative branches of the contracting
governments. The claims are judicial in
nature and belong to an international court.
of justice.
In The Elements of Jurisprudence Sir
Thomas Erskine Holland defined adminis-
tration as the "exercise of political powers
in particular cases within the limits of
the constitution and within the manifoldly
changing activities of the state." Trans-
ferred into the realm of international affairs
of states, this definition means that the
administration of one country should rep-
resent the affairs of the state in relations
with governmental administration of other
countries and with the administration of
international organizations. The principle of
political expediency prevailing in adminis-
trative acts of governments is not applicable
in judicial questions. The judicial branch
of the government respects principles based
on the natural law of ethics, the moral
and invariable strength of principles gov-
erning the behavior of men and political
units, irrespective of specific cases and the
expediency of their settlement. Specific
cases should be decided on the basis of
those principles of justice. The difference
between political astuteness, as adjustable
to particular cases, and judicial rectitude,
as based on moral principles, has been
expressed in the philosophy of progressive
governments by the fact that administrative
officers are variable, while judicial officers
are stable for their lifetimes.
Lacking a compulsory judicial system in
international public and private matters,
the administrative branch of national gov-
ernments represents both the state and
the individual citizen in international judi-
cial problems. This violates the principle
of division between the administrative and
judicial branches of government established
in domestic affairs. The governments of
progressive democracies, while fighting
despotism and dictatorship, have become,
ironically, agents of unconstitutional ortho-
dox methods in international relations,
despite the fact that there exists no right
of international sovereignty in the absence
of a world government.
This suggests the benefits that might be
derived through the formation of a world
government with a world constitution and
compulsory world jurisdiction based upon
a code of public and private international
law, which could define the divisional line
between the. administrative and judicial
functions in international affairs.
The above goal is an optimal one and
one which would take time to reach. But
time is running out for the refugees who
were reduced to poverty fifteen or twenty
years ago. They need help now.
Governments,_ in most cases, do what
they can to forward individual claims. How-
ever, since there is no legitimate judicial
authority to represent and decide interna-
tional private claims, governments are
handicapped in that they handle a strictly
judicial matter in an administrative en-
vironment and by administrative methods.
The result is inadvertent error, as exempli-
fied by negotiations submitted to adminis-
trative routine, in which governments
arbitrarily determine the amount of com-
pensation for damages and losses for their
citizens by means of a certain ratio to the
total figures claimed, on the theory that
claimants exaggerate losses. Such a pre-
sumption is a contradictio in adjectu of the
concept of law and justice. Too often the
amount of claims allowed is set by diplo-
matic negotiations beforehand without re-
gard for evidence and without the knowl-
edge and consent of the claimants.
While the invasion of the judicial field by
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the administrative branch of government
in the existing cirtumstances may be con-
sidered malum necessarium, it would seem
to be an abuse of delegated powers for a
government to give up major parts of the
rights belonging to those who gave the
mandate to negotiate but who did not sur-
render their rights in so doing. It also
would seem questionable for an adminis-
tration to negotiate and not keep a claim-
ant informed of the proceedings. Judicial
procedure is public in character. Govern-
ments should not act as arbitrators but as
attorneys for their citizens, without the
right to agree with the other party's at-
torney to the detriment of a client in the
name of administrative expediency.
The Principle of Equality of
International Claims
To the category of private claims subject
to international treatment belong losses
and damages caused during the war and
occupation, and those caused by a new gov-
ernment which is unable or unwilling to
preserve the security of its citizens and/or
which has a different political approach to
problems of private property.
Regardless of their origin, all types of
claims should be eligible for consideration
and settlement at the same time and with
the same strength as an individual's rights.
Any priority in time or importance given to
damages caused directly or indirectly. by
postwar happenings over those caused by
war is unsubstantiated from the standpoint
of equality before law. When governments
give priority to compensation for damages
and losses suffered by nationalization over
those inflicted by direct war activities, the
technichl reasoning is that as long as no
peace treaty has been signed there can be
no consideration for war damage repara-
THE REFUGEE AND WAR CLAIMS
tions. Extending this reasoning further,
damages then might be compensated be-
tween those governments which were not
at war with each other, but which through
postwar political changes caused damages
or losses to the owners of expropriated or
nationalized rights.
If governments avoid the issue of indi-
vidual damage claims in the hope that the
problem will diminish with time and the
death of claimants, then, from the stand-
point of justice and law, mankind must be
charged with a great liability and govern-
ments must be charged with negligence
sensu stricto.
If there are any reasons to postpone the
settlement of some damages and prefer
others, then war damage claims should
come first for several reasons.
Nationalization and confiscation were
caused by changed political conditions fol-
lowing the war and as a result of the war.
Logically, therefore, the elimination of the
causes which originated the results must
precede the elimination of the results, or
else the causes will continue to exist and
the results will repeat.
Capital investments are subject to na-
tionalization and expropriation. Yet sav-
ings, in an economic sense, must precede
investment. War damages were inflicted on
both savings and investments. Any invest-
ment implies a certain risk; savings is a
basic principle of economics. Thus, it
would seem unjust to give preferential treat-
ment to claims for damages suffered in a
risky venture and to postpone consideration
of basic economic principles.
Damages by nationalization and expro-
priation represent only a fraction of actual
war damages. These pertain to selected
peoples or companies. Total war damages
affect masses of dispossessed and uprooted
people. To favor the few and neglect the
many is like saving roses while forests are
burning.
International law considers war to be a
crime because it uses force which damages
all phases of life. Crude force has always
been condemned in domestic and inter-
national affairs. Nationalization and expro-
priation are the results of conflicts between
the rights of the individual and a totalitar-
ian concept of government. The lawfulness
of political and socio-economic theories
which damage individuals for the sake of
the state is a question of national and in-
ternational reason and justice. From the
standpoint of reason, discussions of such
wrongs must be postponed when force must
be used to repel force. From the standpoint
of justice, all wrongs should be treated
equally and at the same time with the
same strength. Therefore, if any priority
must be given, those acts of wrong which
violate existing. conditions by force should
be treated and punished before determining
the socio-economic question of the validity
of individual rights versus those of the state
or the superiority of either.
Different socio-economic theories may
be put into practice by various govern-
ments. However, this does not mean that
governments should abuse confiscatory
power. Any government has the right to
dispossess its citizens on the basis of emi-
nent domain, but it should pay a just value
to the individual owner. Public condemna-
tion of private property is the right of any
constitutional government as long as there
is a public necessity for such measure and
proper compensation for all damage done
to the private owner. If the two parties can-
not come to an agreement on what is a
proper, or fair price, the individual who
feels damaged may appel to a court of
justice.
These arguments and conclusions based
on legal, logical, economical, sociological,
and, above all, moral considerations, do not
alter the fact that all damages should be
paid for at the same time, not sporadically
nor with priority of one type of damages to
the postponement of all others. If political
complications cause a delay in the formula-
tion of a peace treaty (a political agree-
ment subject to international public law),
then war damages, which are strictly eco-
nomic matters of private citizens, should
be the prerequisites for entering into the
discussion of a peace treaty to which sev-
eral nations are parties. Countries may be
able to survive for twenty or thirty years
without compensation for the destruction
of military and other public objects, but in-
dividuals often cannot survive damages or
losses to their property for that period of
time without extreme hardship.
A closer analysis of these two types of
damages points up several distinguishing
features.
Damages Originated By Direct
War Action
The principle of international law which
recognizes the superior validity or timely
priority of reparation claims of the civilian
population is found in Article 232 of the
Treaty of Versailles. The article reasoned
that although Germany should pay for all
damages, both to private citizens and na-
tions alike, she might be released from rep-
arations for damages (war costs) suffered
by nations. German economic resources
were thought to be inadequate to repair all
damages and losses suffered by the Allies.
In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles,
private damages were set at more than 33
billion dollars. However, on July 9, 1932,
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an agreement signed at Lausanne "put an
end to reparations" which were never paid.
The Lausanne decision poses the follow-
ing question: Do governments have the
right to release a debtor, in'this case an-
other- government, from the payment of
private war damages? The legal argument
against an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion is that governments are only manda-
taries and should not relinquish any rights
of those who gave the mandate. The Treaty
of Versailles was ratified by all nations,
and the rights of compensation became, at
that moment, acquired rights of each pri-
vate citizen who was damaged and claimed
an indemnity. Therefore, the government
did not have the right to enter into any
agreement regarding the elimination of a
provision from the treaty which had be-
come a private right of the individual citi-
zen.
From a legal point of view, the decision
to "put an end to reparations" for damages
suffered by private citizens was an act of
confiscation of private rights of property
incompatible with the principle of prefer-
ence of private initiative and private prop-
erty over statism and communal property.
Governments which accept the princi-
ple of priority of private property over
statism and communal property reverse
themselves in this area and accept the legal
concept that claims which originated by
nationalization are. to be secured first and
those for damages suffered during the war
to be secured eventually or contingently.
From the standpoint of jurisprudence, such
reasoning demonstrates a lack of logic in-
consistent with justice.
Damages Originated by Postwar
Political Changes
During World War II and the fifteen in-
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tervening years to date, mass population
movements were forced upon peoples either
directly by order of the occupying powers
or indirectly by the danger of arrest under
a pretended excuse. This happened in al-
most all countries of Europe, in Korea,
in the Southeast Asian countries of Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Vietnam, in Pakistan,
India, and China, in Congo and in Cuba. It
may happen in Algeria and other African
countries.
The damages and losses to the people
forced to leave these lands are enormous.
Compensation in such cases is possible only
by the adoption and enforcement of a legal
principle governing such claims from the
standpoint of international private law. It
would solve not only similar problems of
the past but would also serve as a deterrent
to future infringements on the rights of
private citizens. The problem inevitably
will arise again in the next decade unless it
is settled now. Africa and Latin America
are areas in which a recurrence of the prob-
lem seems most likely to occur. To avoid
complications in the future it is imperative
that legal principles of international law be
established else political upheavals will take
precedence over justice.
Another abuse of administrative power
is the expropriation of property rights of
the refugee by governments in those coun-
tries which the refugee was forced to flee.
New governments annex the property on
the assumption that the same has been
abandoned by its owner. Squatting means
taking possession of property or certain
rights without title or legal justification, and
maintaining an undisturbed exertion' of
those rights over a period of time without
the permission of the rightful owner. After
a prescribed period of time the previous
title owner loses his rights to the squatter.
No one, particularly a government, has
justified legally the. rights of squatting the
property of a private citizen except on the
basis of fictional rights and changing statutes
of limitations, or the right of squatting for
a period shorter than it was before the
war.
To create the fiction of legality, some
governments recently issued new laws sub-
stantially abbreviating the period neces-
sary to acquire property of absent owners.
Refugees who owned property in these
countries but were forced to leave them,
often are unaware of the new laws. More-
over, some of the new governments now
operating in those countries from which
the refugees were forced to flee are either
not recognized by other governments or, if
recognized, maintain, at best, strained rela-
tions. The result is that a refugee often has
difficulty in trying to communicate with
officials of his native country. In many
cases, the refugee-owner has lost contact
with his old country because family mem-
bers and friends have been killed, dis-
placed or have died a natural death.
Squattage is possible only bona fide. By
no legal standard can nationalization under
existing conditions be considered one in
good faith. The abbreviated statutes of
limitation are rationalized on the conven-
ient assumption that the property has been
abandoned. The property cannot be con-
sidered abandoned because the owner did
not return and take possession of it; he
could not return because the state of poli-
tical tension between his native country
and his adopted country makes it difficult
or impossible for him to return to the
property. A private person cannot hope to
solve political problems against the will of
a new government in his native country
and without the support of the government
of his adopted country.
The right of a new government to ab-
breviate the preclusive period to the detri-
ment of the original owner becomes a ques-
tion of international private law when the
original owner becomes a citizen of an-
other country. In such situations the prob-
lem of ownership cannot be decided upon
by unilateral action or legislation of the old
country's new government when the second
party to the dispute is absent. Granted that
in cases of immobile property the princi-
ple of lex rei sitae, the law of the proper-
ty's location, is decisive, is internationally
acknowledged. However, it is wrong to
change this law with the appearance of
each new government if it affects citizens
of another country.
The conflict between the application of
the old principle governing immobile prop-
erty in the country in which it is located
and the modern demand for international
capital movements is one of the many prob-
lems which could be settled by a codified
system of international private law. It
means that res sita is subject to property
changes by legal acquisition with compen-
sation. Any other attitude would eventually
work in reverse against those countries
which confiscated property in the past and
might invest in the future.
Confiscation may have repercussions
both domestically and internationally. An
example of a domestic nature may involve
the confiscation of houses. If a government
confiscates houses it destroys the initiative
of the private builder. The result is that
such governments, already overburdened
with financial responsibilities, must assume
still another, that of building houses for an
increasing population. International reper-
cussions occur where a government which
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once used confiscatory power now invests
in other countries. There may come a time
when the country accepting investments
or economic aid points to the investor-
country's past and itself exercises powers
of confiscation against the present giver.
In some cases where new governments
took control of countries, new laws were
enacted which maintained that administra-
tors who assumed the duties of the admin-
istration of property in the absence of
owners were obliged to submit financial
and activities reports only for the ten years
following the cessation of hostilities. In
most cases this meant only until 1955. If a
pre-war owner did not demand the state-
ments and payments by that time, the ad-
ministrator was to be free of any respon-
sibility. This would seem to be an unusual
regulation in light of the fact that most of
the countries involved in the war still are
legally at war in the absence of peace trea-
ties. Moreover, these new governments
have abbreviated important legal periods
despite the fact that the prewar owners
would imperil their civic status in their
adopted countries if they attempted to com-
municate with officials of their native coun-
tries. This certainly is not bona fides. No
government has the right to dismiss the
administrator of private property from his
responsibilities to the detrirfient of the
rightful owner. Thus, the new government
of a country should be responsible for
everything that happens after the ten years
of the official responsibility of an adminis-
trator have elapsed and also be held to
assume responsibility for any actions of the
administrator before that time.
This basic legal situation makes all
changes "internationally" illegal in a world
which is still technically at war. It calls for
uniform regulation by international law, in-
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stead of such matters being left to individ-
ual countries for decision. In short, unless
international regulation and control is
established along with the responsibility of
governments, the problem will recur and
compound the wrong.
International Legal Status of
Individuals
The situation of displaced persons is
further complicated in those countries
which hold that only those persons who
were citizens of that country at the out-
break of the war have the right to protec-
tion by their present governments. Other
countries stipulate that displaced persons
must have been citizens at the time the
damage was inflicted. From a legal stand-
point, these approaches are debatable.
Political conditions in many countries
changed during and after the war. The
majority of persons who emigrated to other
countries and applied for citizenship in
the new country received citizenship. Le-
gally, it is irrelevant whether they were citi-
zens of their adopted country at the out-
break of war or at the time the damage was
inflicted. It would be unnatural and short
of impossible for displaced persons to live
even for a short time in a state of suspen-
sion regarding their personal, material, and
civilian status. They are displaced and dis-
possessed by one country and at the same
time are denied the protection of another.
The international status of any person
in the world must be divided into two cate-
gories: the political or public, and the ma-
terial or private.
Granting political asylum to refugees has
been recognized since ancient times. Gro-
tius, in his work, De iure belli ac pacis,
refers to the case of Nauplius, who escaped
to the Chalcidians who refused to deliver
Nauplius over to the Greeks.' He mentions
Gyllipus, the Lacedaemonian, and de-
scribes political asylum as being motivated
by the "privilege granted by the law of
nature to the innocent."'2 Grotius quotes
Cicero, Pausanias, Servius, Theophilus, and
Statius;3 and finally, he refers to Aeschy-
lus. 4
In the third century a class of men
known in the Roman Empire as iuris con-
sult or iuris prudentes dealt with the prob-
lem of political asylum before codices.
Gregorianus, Hermogenianus, and Theo-
dosianus of the fifth century and the Digesta
or Pandecta of Justinian in the sixth cen-
tury absorbed it as a principle of a man's
political rights in the field of international
law. More recently, America's Thomas
Jefferson said: "Every man has a right to
live somewhere on the earth."5
If the status of displaced persons in re-
gard to their material rights is not clarified
by a similar principle of international law
as it has been accepted for centuries regard-
ing man's political rights, the legal situation
will remain completely confused:
(a) the government of a refugee's newly
adopted country will not consider the new
citizen to be eligible for compensation for
damages suffered in hisgnative country out
of a lump sum which the adopted country
may obtain from the refugee's native coun-
try, if the refugee was not a citizen of his
adopted country at the moment the dam-
ages and losses were inflicted. This is un-
just because the establishment of the time
of the damage or loss is almost impossible
1 2 GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIs 339
(Whewell transl. 1853).
2 Ibid.
3 Id. at 354.
4 Id. at 358-59.
5 Message to Congress, 1801.
to prove, because of the refugee's ab-
sence from the place of the damage and
finally, because of the elapse of almost
twenty years. Therefore, the first require-
ment should be replaced by a presumptio
iuris et de iure that if he later becomes a
citizen of the new country or took a perm-
anent residence in it, his rights to protec-
tion should work retroactively.
(b) Such a solution is necessary because
new governments of the refugee's native
country could presumably refuse individual
compensation for private claims on the fol-
lowing reasoning:
(1) Previous citizens are now citizens
of another country and a treaty between
the two countries has been concluded with
an agreement to take over a proportionate
reimbursement of the total claim, including
reimbursement of all those persons who ac-
quired citizenship after the outbreak of war
or after their property suffered damage or
loss. Thus the payment ought to be made
from the lump sum which is the final set-
tlement between the two countries.
(2) Even if the old country would ac-
cept the claims of its previous citizens for
individual treatment, it would refuse to
acknowledge any damage and compensa-
tion for those claims which were originated
by nationalization and confiscation to which
its own citizens were subject.
(3) If a new government accepted the
responsibility for nationalization acts
against the property of former or absent
citizens, it could nullify responsibility by
claiming past taxes and re-evaluating them
in terms of the country's inflated currency.
Proper interest on the taxes accrued during
the intervening years might represent twice
as much as the taxes themselves. This
probably would consume the deflated value
of the property so that it would be sold at
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auction to cover the taxes. Revenues raised
in this manner would leave little, if any-
thing, to the original owner.
(4) If an auction should leave some
balance to the previous owner, the refu-
gee's native country probably would not
transfer the equivalent of that amount to
the refugee's credit in his adopted country,
because of exchange provisions. It prob-
ably would deposit the balance in a foreign
account within the native country of the
refugee. In other words, the old country
would set up a double standard: concern-
ing rights of former citizens, the refugee
would be classed as a foreigner; but regard-,
ing duties he would be considered a citizen.
Such a double standard is contrary to legal
principles.
(5) If the new governments of the native
countries extended an invitation to former
citizens to return to the native country and
to live there from the deposited capital,
the solution in most cases would have no
practical meaning, because of political
reasons.
(6) The new government of the native
country could take the stand that its former
citizens should file their claims with the
government of that country which started
the war and that refugees should wait for
compensation until a treaty has been
signed. This works extreme hardship on the
refugee, some of whom have exhausted
their resources after twenty years of wait-
ing.
(c) The new government of the country
which started the war would have its own
reasons for refusing to pay reparations to
citizens of the attacked country, namely:
(1) That diplomatic and consular rela-
tions between the -two countries have not
been restored.
(2) That it should not pay damages to
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the country of the claimant's prewar citi-
zenship because the claimant is now a citi-
zen of another country.
These are but a few of the complications
which might hinder the refugee and his
claims. Primarily the complications are
political in nature and have no relationship
to justice. In effect, they make claimants
who became citizens of other countries in-
eligible for any international protection.
The intent of law, whether national or
international, has always been that damage
and loss must be repaired and repaid by
those who caused the wrong. This intent
has been distorted by denying private citi-
zens the right of claiming reparations on an
international level and by leaving the settle-
ment of private claims to administrative
bargaining instead of international judicial
decision. Therefore, it becomes impera-
tive to establish the principle of continued
legal identity of an individual as a party,
subject to international private law.
During the past twenty years many
changes have occurred all over the world
so basic that a restitutio in integrum of
properties is now in most cases either im-
possible or is of no material value because
of completely changed living conditions.
The only way in which damages might be
partially repaid is the compensation of ma-
terial losses suffered through war action
and through changes in political, economic,
and social conditions resulting from war.
The New Country's Duties Toward A
New Citizen
While for the time being there is no pro-
tection of a displaced person in his old
country, the country of his present resi-
dence should assume protection regardless
of the time of acquisition of citizenship. In
this connection, Jefferson's principle could
very well be paraphrased to "Everybody
must have his material rights secured in
the world."
The inclusion of all who are now citi-
zens of a contracting government, not only
those who were already citizens before the
outbreak of war or at the moment of in-
flicted damage or loss, can be justified by
international law which protects the per-
sonal and material rights of anyone who
lives in a country, regardless of whether he
is a citizen. This legal principle is supported
by the fact that some of the countries did
not exist before World War II, while others
lost their existence as independent politi-
cal units. Such basic changes offer suffi-
cient motivation for the demand that the
country in which a refugee resides should
be responsible for his protection. The re-
sponsibility of the adopted country is in-
creased by the unavoidable interdependence
of the political, social, and economic rela-
tions of the many countries of the world,
which are enhanced by the technological
progress in communication and transpor-
tation, both handicaps to human relations
in the past. The new world demands move-
ments of money, goods, and people in quan-
tities never before experienced.
Along with these general reasons which
support the contention that Jefferson's
paraphrased thesis should become an
axiom, there are other more specific mo-
tives sustaining this contention regarding
the refugee who suffered damages during
and after World War I.
(1) During and after the war, all immi-
grants, including those from enemy coun-
tries, had to serve in the armed forces of
their new countries, regardless of whether
or not they obtained citizenship. If they
refused, they forfeited their rights of ever
becoming citizens. Under such conditions,
the refugee's duties to a new country musi
be qualified as absolute.
(2) Any individual must pay taxes in
the country of his residence even if his
income originates in foreign countries; the
lone exception is in special treaties, the
purpose of which is to avoid double taxa-
tion. This tax concept also is an absolute
duty.
(3) Everyone who lives in a country,
whether permanently or temporarily, must
obey that country's laws, rules, and regu-
lations, both legal and administrative, per-
sonal or material, civil and criminal. This,
too, is an absolute duty.
Consequently, if immigrants or even
temporary residents have duties toward
their new country, then that country would
create a dangerous precedent if it denied
protection to the immigrant during this
period of time. Law in general and inter-
national law in particular is double-edged.
Before the outbreak of World War II,
most countries whose citizens suffered
losses or damages were subject to regular
diplomatic relations, and their citizens were
subject to reciprocal international protec-
tion. The outbreak of war did not change
these mutual relations, at least not when
both contracting countries were combat-
ants against a common enemy. The fact
that some of these countries came under
the influence of different political systems
of government during and after the war is
no reason to punish their former citizens
who are now residents of countries with dif-
ferent systems of government. This is a
question of reciprocity in international re-
lations.
The continuation of normal and friendly
relations between countries which joined
the Allied Nations has been maintained
without interruption since the Treaty of
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Versailles in 1919. Therefore, there would
seem to be little reason to eliminate from
protection all those persons who were not
yet citizens of a newly adopted country
when the last war broke out, or at the
moment when the damages or loss of prop-
erty was inflicted. This would be an unjusti-
fiable discrimination against the former
citizens of a friendly nation who are now
residents or citizens of the adopted country.
Such a situation would be contrary to the
concept and spirit of international law.
Neither the native country nor the newly
adopted country of a refugee would gain
or lose by recognizing the rights of the
individual, as payments made by either
the native or the adopted country to its
former or present citizens, respectively,
should be subject to reparations paid by
the aggressor. Thus, by not accepting con-
tinued protection from any one of the
countries in which the refugees were once
or are now citizens, only the damaged
refugees would stand to lose, because their
claims would not be recognized by any
country. In this way, the aggressor country
would gain by not paying the damage of
the particular refugee who was not a citizen
of the adopted country at the moment of
the outbreak of war or the infliction of
damage. Such a stand lacks any reasonable
motivation from the standpoint of plain
justice and is contrary to the spirit of any
law, national or international.
The foregoing discussion points out the
partial and temporary solution which could
be accomplished by the immediate elimi-
nation of the requirement of the adopted
country that citizenship of the claimant
at the moment of damage must be proved
in order to make him eligible for protection
by the adopted country. Anyone who is
residing permanently in a country which is
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entering negotiations regarding war and
postwar damages and losses, whatever their
reason and nature, should have the right
of protection. This would eliminate, at
least for the time being, the vacuum exist-
ing in international private law which is in
conflict with fairness, logic, and justice.
It also would bridge the gap which will
exist as long as the legal identity of an
individual in international material disputes
remains unestablished.
The problem is not a question of selected
countries or persons. Its factors and conse-
quences accompany uprooted and dispos-
sessed persons all over the world, whether
they are stateless or citizens of a particular
country. Because of the magnitude and
worldwide extent of damages to these
people, a problem exists that is international
in character, and needs international prin-
ciples of law to be solved.
Small local and individual injustices
create international injustices which lead
to war. Establishment of international prin-
ciples of law might serve as deterrents to
aggressors. Thus, aside from the refugees,
any country involved in a war would bene-
fit, if such an international principle were
established.
Conclusions
The proper solution to the problem of
the refugee and his losses is possible only
by the acceptance of righteous, interna-
tionally approved principles based on
justice or, at least, legality and objectivity,
not on casual expediency. No government
can morally ignore the settlement of private
claims for damages and losses which
occurred during and after war.
International private- law should estab-
lish certain remedies to eliminate the lack
of protection available to private citizens
against damages resulting from interna-
tional adventures and crimes, the incapacity
of new governments to maintain security in
their own countries following wars, and
the unwillingness of governments to com-
pensate private individuals for damages
caused by wars and postwar actions.
This is a proposed solution:
A. In the field of the substantive material
law of international principles:
(1) The definition of the private charac-
ter of claims of individual persons for
damages and losses suffered during, after,
and because of war.
(2) Equality of international private
claims, whether caused by direct war action
or by acts consequential to political
changes.
(3) International legal status of indi-
viduals.
(4) The right of the individual to repre-
sent his material claims internationally.
B. In the field of the adjective interna-
tional private law, regarding its procedures
and the establishment of proper instances
for the handling of private claims, the
problem must be divided into two major
phases, because of the complexity and
slow progress of international relations:
(1) Phase One: the acceptance of Arbi-
tration Tribunals for settlement of material
claims of private citizens and stateless
persons. Such tribunals have certain
precedents.
(a) The Hague Conference created in
1899 the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
It provided that for the purposes of arbi-
tration, judges should be nominated by
every member country to the convention.
For specific cases, judges should be selected
from a permanent list of arbitrators avail-
able to the Court. They were supposed to
be individuals with proper training in gen-
eral and in the jurisprudence of law in
particular. They should be known by their
''competence in problems of international
law and [should be] of the highest moral
reputation." 6 These requirements created
a class of experts in international law simi-
lar to the iuris consulti or iuris prudentes
of the Roman Empire in the third century.
* (b) The second Hague Convention of
1907 accepted as an obligation of all con-
tracting parties the use of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration "for the recovery of
contract debts claimed from governments
of one country by the government of
another country as being due to its
nationals." This Convention eliminated the
application of force and demanded the
compliance with the results of such an
international arbitration. 7 Similar tribunals
were effectively used after World War I.
Along these lines, the problem of refu-
gees could be handled successfully without
waiting until all of the obstacles of political
issues were resolved. The only requirement
would be to handle both the substantive
and adjective law in a judicial manner:
not by transferring the creation of such
arbitration commissions to members of
political delegations constituting the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Security Council of
the United Nations, but by relying more on
the selections made by the International
Court of Justice in The Hague, which is
fully equipped to handle the matters in
a judicial manner, and with the necessary
guarantee as to the objectiveness of its
legal decisions.
The world-wide economic importance of
6 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, Hague, 1899.
7 Convention Respecting the Limitation of the
Employment of Force, Hague, 1907.
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these losses affecting the postwar recovery
of many people, and the bitterness of the
common man caused by the involvement
of his private material claims in the struggle
for political power calls for an improvement
of conditions. From the standpoint of
jurisprudence, the present situation is a
malfunctioning of world justice caused by
the usurpation, under the pressure of cir-
cumstances in which no other agency is
legally competent, of the judicial powers
of private citizens in their own govern-
mental administration sensu stricto.
This alone would be a sufficient reason-
to apply the arbitration of the International
Court of Justice in handling this type of
claim by private citizens. This is the closest
the adjective international law comes to
dealing with such problems in a judicial
manner. It would fill out, at least tempo-
rarily, the gap created by the lack of any
judicial authority competent to handle the
rights of private persons.
(2) Phase Two: the establishment of
an International Court of Justice for the
settlement of international private claims
in general. If political issues delay the
acceptance of the judicial competence of an
International Court of Justice in public
disputes, there is no motivation for the
delay of the application of the normal
judicial decision and acceptance of the
competence of the International Court of
Justice in international material claims of
private citizens.
The moral aspect should be paramount
in considerations regarding the questions
of who is responsible and who is eligible
for reparations of various kinds. From this
standpoint, the problem should be solved
internationally as a principle of codified
international law. World War II must be
ended by principles and methods aimed at
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the preservation of justice in the world and
the elimination of crime among people and
nations. The tragedies of the war must
result in a strengthening of the world system
by an international law established on hard.
crystals of righteousness and high morals,
not on the shifting sands of pseudo-political
expediency.
The question remains: which power will
enforce the decisions in such cases? In his
criticism of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,
this writer suggested that the United
Nations require for membership the inser-
tion in the national constitutions of apply-
ing countries provisions that they will
abandon wars, arms production and na-
tional armaments, and will settle all dis-
putes before a proper judicial forum of the
United Nations, which will carry out the
decision "by forces established by the
United Nations to prevent or end aggression
or to enforce its decision."s
s Spitzer, Dumbarton Oaks Project of World De-
mocracy, DALHOWSIE REVIEW (April, 1945); see
also HOLBORN REVIEW (April, 1945).
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As the judicial branch of the United
Nations, the International Court of Justice
would issue decisions in disputes among
nations. The decisions would be enforced
by the proposed police force of the United
Nations. The same court would be compe-
tent to decide, and the same police force
would be empowered to execute decisions
of the court in private material claims of
refugees.
Nations, their governments, and indi-
viduals condemned by such a court should
be required to pay damages, however long
it takes. There should be no omission or
curtailment of any private compensation
for damages; the abridgement of legitimate
claims is unjust and impractical because it
creates resentment and social ferment in
those who suffered the damages and merely
encourages those who commit the crime
and escape full punishment.
Just decisions of an International Court
of Justice would create a firm belief in the
security -and confidence in international
justice among peoples of the world.
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